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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The Law of the Case Doctrine Prohibits the District Court from Finding in 
Ovoosition to the Court of Appeals a Failure to Demonstrate Prejudice. 
As set out in the Opening Brief at pages 6-9, the law of the case doctrine prohibits the 
district court from finding, in direct opposition to the Court of Appeals, a failure to demonstrate 
prejudice resulting from trial counsel's failure to properly advise his client of his Fifth 
Amendment rights. 
In attempting to avoid this conclusion, the state argues that there was no principle of law 
articulated by the Court of Appeals that was contrary to the district court's later decision. The 
state's argument is that the Court of Appeals in finding that "the record before this Court on 
appeal demonstrates that the results of Esquivel's psychosexual evaluation were considered by 
the district court in making its sentencing decision and was a factor contributing to the length of 
his sentence" actually meant something different from what it stated and really was only finding 
that t l~e  psychosexual evaluation might have been considered in sentencing. To eillbrace this 
argument, this Court must now find that it was incapable of writing a sentence that accurately 
expressed its intent. 
As both Carlos and the state agree, when an appellate court, in deciding a case presented, 
states in its opiilion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement 
becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout the case's subsequent 
progression both in the trial court and upon subsequeilt appeal. Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 
201 P.3d 1282 (2009). Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 7-8; Respondent's Brief at page 11. 
And, as set out in Carlos's Opening Brief and not disputed by the state, the law of the case 
doctrine applies to mixed questions of law and fact as well as questions of law. Airstream, Inc. 
v. CITFinuncial Services, Inc., 115 Idaho 569, 574-575, 768 P.2d 1302, 1307-1308 (1988); 
Insurance Associates Covp. v. Hunsen, 116 Idaho 948,950-51,782 P.2d 1230, 1232-33 (1989). 
The question of whether prejudice has been established in a post-conviction claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52, 54, 764 
P.2d 129, 131 (Ct. App. 1988). Appellant's Opening Brief at page 8. 
In deciding Carlos's appeal of the dismissal of his claim of ineffective assista~~ce of 
counsel. this Court wrote: 
2. Psychosexual evaluation 
Esquivel asserts that the district court erred in denying his request for appointment 
of counsel to assist him in his post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to properly challenge the psychosexual evaluation used 
against him after Esquivel requested trial coui~sel to do so. A psychosexual 
evaluation conducted for sentencing purposes is considered a critical stage of the 
defendailt's case. Estvada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562, 149 P.3d 833, 837 (2006). 
Therefore a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel's advice regarding 
his or her participation in an evaluation. Id. at 558-59, 149 P.3d at 837-38. Trial 
counsel's failure to properly advise a defendant regarding his or her Fifth 
Amendment rights in submitting to a psychosexual evaluation may amount to 
deficient performance. See id. at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. When there is a 
reaso~lahle probability that the sentence would be different had the psychosexual 
evaluation not been included, or had been more favorable to the defendant, a trial 
counsel's deficient performance may also be prejudicial. See Wood, 132 Idaho at 
101,967 P.2d at 715; Estrada, 143 Idaho at 565, 149 P.3d at 840. 
Esquivel's application alleges facts indicating the possibility that his court-ordered 
psychosexual evaiuatioll was inadequately conducted and that he voiced his 
concerns about the evaluation to his trial counsel. Esquivel's application, in 
essence, claims his trial counsel was deiicient for failing to either question the 
conduct of the expert who performed the evaluation or request that a different 
expert conduct a new psychosexual evaluation. The record before this Court on 
appeal demonstrates that the results of Esquivel's psychosexual evaluation 
were considered by the district court in making its sentencing decision and 
was a factor contributing to the length of his sentence. 
Esquivel's application does not set forth all the elements necessary to succeed in 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, nor is his claim clearly or artfully 
worded. However, in seelting appointment of counsel to assist him in pursuing a 
post-conviction claim, Esquivel does not need posit a complete claim in his 
application because it is understood that a pro se applicant rarely has the sltill or 
knowledge to do so. See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 729-93,102 P.3d at 11 11-12. 
Instead, Esquivel's application needed only to allege facts that mightpossibly give 
rise to a valid claim. See id. at 793, 102 P.3d at 11 12. While we offer no opinion 
on the appropriateiless of his trial counsel's conduct, the facts alleged by Esquivel, 
combined with the record, raises tl~epossibility of a valid claim as to counsel's 
inaction regarding the psychosexual evaluation. Therefore, we conclude that the 
district court erred in denying the request for appointment of counsel to pursue 
this specific post-conviction claim. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's 
summary dismissal and denial of counsel as to this claim. On remand, we instruct 
the district court to appoint counsel to assist Esquivel in pursuing the post- 
conviction claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to arrange an 
independent psychosexual evaluation or otherwise mitigate the effects of the 
court-ordered evaluation. 
Esquivel v. State, 2007 Unpublished Opinion No. 541, p. 6-7 (bold added; italics original). 
This decision by this Court specifically finds that the results of the psychosexual 
evaluation were considered by the district court in making its sentenciilg decision and were a 
factor contributing to the length of Carlos's sentence. Under the law of the case doctrine, 
therefore, the district court erred when it detenniiled on remand that the psychosexual evaluatioi~ 
was irrelevant to its sentencing decision and had no influence 011 the length of the sentence. "The 
psychosexual evaluation did not increase or reduce his sentence. Esquivel did not receive a 
different sentence, either enhanced reduced, based on his refusal to cooperate in the 
psychosexual evaluation or because of its contents." CR 92 (underscore original). 
The state attempts to avoid this result by arguing that this Court, the Court of Appeals, 
was really only considering whether the psychosexual evaluation might have affected the 
sentencing decision, and therefore its statement that the evaluation was considered and was a 
factor contributing to the length of the sentence really meant something quite different from this 
Court's literal words - that the evaluation might have had an effect but that the district court was 
free to come to a collclusion quite opposite and find that the psychosexual evaluation was 
irrelevant to its actions in sentencing Carlos. Respondent's Brief at 12-13. 
In short, the state is asking this Court to find that it could not write a straightforward 
sentence and that when it wrote: "The record before this Court on appeal demonstrates that the 
results of Esquivel's psychosexual evaluation were considered by the district court in making its 
sentencing decision and was a factor contributing to the length of his sentence," it actually meant 
something like, "The record before this Court on appeal demonstrated that the results of 
Esquivel's psychosexual evaluation might have been considered in the imposition of sentence, 
but the district court should revisit that issue and make its own determination." This suggested 
incapacity on the part of this Court is incorrect. 
Rather, the only logical collclusioll is that this Court meant what it said and that the 
district court's finding in direct opposition violates the law of the case doctrine. That being so, 
Carlos now asks that the order dismissing his petition be reversed. 
B. In the First Alternative, the District Court's Finding that it did not Rely upon 
the Psychosexual Evaluation in Sentencing Carlos is Clearly Erroneous. 
As set out in Carlos's Opening Brief and above, reversal of the decision dismissing his 
petition is required by the law of the case doctrine. Moreover, the district court decision must 
also be reversed because it is clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Queen v. Stale, 146 Idaho 502, 
503, 198 P.3d 731, 732 (Ct. App. 2008); Appellant's Opening Brief at 9-10. 
At the time Carlos was sentenced, the state made a long argument for the sentence 
ultimately given by the court based largely upon the psychosexual evaluation: 
[Hle continues to pose a more significant risk. I-Ie went to SANE and was 
evaluated, although he was not particularly forthcoining in the SANE evaluation. 
He refused to answer the MSI questions because he said he just didn't like the 
questions and thought that they were just, in his words, sick or perverted or 
something along those lines. He wouldn't appropriately answer the Millon and so 
that test couldn't be scored. Unfortunately the examination doesn't give the 
evaluation - doesn't give the Court as much infonnation as you might have lilted, 
but that is the defendant's doing and he chose not to he cooperative with that. It is 
interesting to note that Dr. Engle . . . immediately detects that [Carlos] has an 
attitude of arrogance and an attitude that conveys clearly that he is a victim ofthe 
instant offense, the criminal justice system, and the evaluation process and that's 
reflected in Dr. Engle's evaluation of the defendant. 
So looking at the risk, Judge, I think when Dr. Engel says he's at least a medium 
risk to reoffend, that's in the best light given that the defendant doesn't finish on 
testing in this case. He's in total denial of what happened. . . . 
Given all that, Your I-ionor, the State in evaluating this case knows that this is a 
situation that calls out for a prison sentence. There are issues which involve 
punishment and retribution. There are concerns that the defendant is not a 
rehabilitation candidate at this time because he is in total denial[.] 
T (30424) pg. 256-258. (In this regard the state is too modest because the record shows the trial 
court adopted its argument.) 
In giving Carlos the precise sentence recommended by the state, the district court 
specifically referred to Dr. Engel's report as a basis for its sentence. 
So when I look at all these facts and I look at the fact that Mr. Esquivel was really 
not cooperative in that evaluation and I realize that there's an argument to be 
made that a person does this if they are innocent of the charge, but 1 was 
concerned when I saw that he didn't complete the part of the test and I don't buy 
the whole idea that he was unco~~lfortable wit11 answering questions about his own 
sexual interests. He was aware that this was an important evaluation that the 
Court was going to take into consideration in deciding what to do. I'm concerned 
again with the guarded nature in which he answered some of the questions by the 
evaluator. True it is that - it's not to be unexpected that an individual will get an 
evaluation of a moderate level of risk because of denial, but thefact ofthe matter 
is tlzat the Court cannot ignore the fact tlzat he was evaluated as having a 
moderate level ofrisk. Although today he's indicated that he's interested in 
having and attending the appropriate therapy, I want to note that it's easy to come 
into this Court and make those kinds of assertions, hut all along in his comments 
to the evaluator he made it clear that he was not interested in having any sort of 
treatment. 
T (30242) pg. 270 (italics added) 
Then, in denying Carlos's Rule 35 motion, the district court specifically cited the 
psychosexual evaluation as a reason to deny relief. It stated: 
The S.A.N.E. evaluation stated Esquivel was a moderate risk to roffend and the 
evaluator opined he was not alllenahle to treatment because in part he denied an 
offense occurred and was uninterested and unwilling to participate in sex offender 
treatment. 
CR (30424) 121 ; Memorandum Decision (denying Rule 35 Motion ), pg. 4. Esquivel v. State, 
Docket No. 32689, Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 21-22 
Then, after this Court remanded with instructions to the district court to appoint counsel 
to assist Carlos in pursing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court again 
dismissed his petition, finding, in opposition to everything it had previously stated on the topic, 
that: 
While the Court of Appeals suggests in its decision that the mention of the 
psychosexual evaluation implied that the Court relied on the report, that is not the 
case. 
This finding, i.e., that the psychosexual evaluation played no part in the determination of 
Carlos's sentence, is clearly enoneous. Even though the state urges this Court on appeal to find 
that the district court's conclusion on remand that the psychosexual report was merely mentioned 
and not relied upon in sentencing is accurate, it is not consistent with the record. The record is 
clear. The state argued extensively based upon the psychosexual report, and the district court did 
not merely mention the report, it specifically stated that it was going to talte the report into 
consideration in imposing a sentence, that it could not ignore the report's conclusion about rislc to 
reoffend, that despite Carlos's in-court statements about his desire for therapy, the psychosexual 
report proved those statements to be false, and that the report was a primary reason for denial of 
Rule 35 relief. T (30424) pg. 256-258, T (30242) pg. 270, CR (30424) 121. Despite the district 
corn's statements upon remand and the state's arguments now offered, the record obviously 
establishes, just as this Court earlier held, that the psychosexual report was considered and was a 
factor in determining the length of sentence imposed. 
The state also argues that "to the extent any inference of prejudice could be made from 
the mention of the psychosexual evaluation by the district court or by the prosecutor, the district 
court itself 'clearly disproved' that claim" when it wrote on remand that it had "determined 
Esquivel's sentence based on the testimony he gave and the evidence produced at trial and not on 
the psychological evaluation." Respondent's Brief at 16. The problem for the state is that this 
argument is circular and establishes nothing. The state is saying that the district court's holding 
on remand that there was no prejudice as a result of the ineffective assistance of counsel cannot 
be found to be contrary to the record because the district court says that it is not inconsistent with 
the record. This argument is logically flawed and should be rejected. 
The record clearly establislles that the psycl~osexual evaluation was used to determine the 
proper sentence to impose in this case. The district court's holding to the contrary was clearly 
erroneous. 
C. In the Second Alternative, Reversal is Required Because the State Did Not and 
Cannot Demonstrate Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that the Error in Denying Carlos 
his State and Federal Constitutional Rights to Remain Silent was Harmless. 
As set out in the Opening Brief, the dismissal of Carlos's petition must be reversed because it 
violates the law of the case doctrine and is clearly erroneous. It must also be reversed because in 
accord with DeRushe' v. State, 146 Idaho 699,200 P.3d 1148 (2009), the error in denying Carlos 
his right to remain silent must be analyzed under the constitutional error standard of Chapmaiz v. 
Calfornia, 386 U.S. 18,82 S.Ct. 824, rehgdenied, 386 U.S. 987,87 S.Ct. 1283 (1967), a 
standard the state did not and cannot meet. Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 10-12. 
As discussed in the Opening Brief, DeRushC had filed a petition alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel in that trial counsel had deprived him of the right to testify in his own 
behalf. And, even though DeRushC framed this issue as a claim of ineffective assistance oE 
counsel and there is no reference in any of the appellate opinion to any record below indicating 
that DeRushC ever framed the issue in any other way at any time in the post-conviction 
proceedings, the Supreme Court held, "The District Court erred in analyzing DeRushk's claim as 
alleging ineffective assistance of coulsel rather than as alleging denial of his constitutiol~al right 
to testify in his own defense." DeRushe' v. State, 146 Idaho at 603-4, 200 P.3d at 1152-53. 
Carlos has argued by analogy that likewise a claim that counsel deprived a defendant of his right 
to remain silent, must also be analyzed as a denial of a constitutional right and subjected to the 
Chapman harmless error standard rather than the ineffective assistance standard set out in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Chapman v. California, supra. 
The state has chosen not to respond to this argument. The state's brief does not cite 
DeRushe', nor does it make any argument that DeRushk was wrongly decided or that it does not 
apply to this case. See Respondent's Brief, p. iii-iv (Table of Cases does not include any 
reference to DeRushk or any case which itself cites DeRushk) and pages 17-21. Rather, the state 
cites pre-DeRushk case law and asserts that under those cases the district court should not have 
applied the Chapman standard because the claim was not framed as a constitutional claim in the 
petition. 
The logical collclusion to be drawn from the state's failure to discuss DeRushk and its 
applicability to this case is that the state believes Carlos's analysis of the case and its 
applicability to his case are correct. If the state did not believe that DeRushk holds that 
constitutional issues must be analyzed as Carlos argues, it would certainly have cited the case and 
argued either that the case does not hold that the Chapman standard must be applied even when 
the issue is not so framed by the petitioner, or that soinehow DeRushk, despite its holding, does 
not apply to Carlos's case. 
The only argument the state makes that could be, if inore completely made, construed to 
argue against an application of DeRushk to this case, so as to require an application of the 
Chapman harmless error analysis, is its argument that Estvada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 
833 (2006), dealt only with the right to advice of counsel regarding submission to a psychosexual 
evaluation. From this the state concludes that because Carlos cited Estrada in his petition, he 
was only asserting the denial of the assistance of counsel, and was not asserting an "invasion on 
any decision that Esquivel alone was required to make, e.g., whether he would testify at trial." 
Respondent's Brief at pages 19-20. 
This argument fails in two ways. First, while Estrada does hold that a defendant has the 
right to the advice of counsel with regard to participation in a psychosexual evaluation, 143 Ida110 
at 563, 194 P.3d at 838, the case also holds that the Fifth Amendment right against self- 
incrimillation applies to psychosexual evaluations. In other words, contrary to the state's 
argument, Estvada holds not only that a defendant has a right to counsel at the time of an 
evaluation, but also that a defendant has the right against self-incrimination at the time of an 
evaluation. Therefore, a reference to Estrada in Carlos's petition does not imply a reference only 
to the right to assistance of counsel, but also implies a reference to the constitutional right to 
remain silent, a decision that Carlos alone was required to make - specifically whether he would 
waive that right. 
And, second, even if a reference to Eslvada ill a petition for post-conviction relief could 
somehow be interpreted as limiting any potential claims related to the denial of counsel at a 
critical stage, rather than the denial of the right against self-incrimination, Estvada was decided 
well before DeRushk, and when DeRushk is considered, the result is that the Chapman harmless 
error standard must be applied in this case. 
Finally, the state argues that even if the Chapman standard is applied, relief is not 
appropriate because "It is clear from the district court's statements that its sentencing decision 
was not based on the psychosexual evaluation but on other factors." Respondent's Brief at 20- 
21. Again, however, this is a circular argument. The record from the sentencing makes very 
clear that the district court did rely on the psychosexual evaluation in imposing sentence and 
denying Rule 35 relieE Likewise, the Court of Appeals found that the psychosexual evaluation 
was considered and was a factor contributing to the length of the sentence. It was only on 
remand from the Court of Appeals that the district court made statements that it did not rely on 
the evaluation, and it is that finding that is being appealed here. Simply repeating statements 
made by the district court on remand that are unsupported by the record cannot make those 
statenlents true or valid, nor can it overcome the fact that the error in denying Carlos his right to 
remain silent at the time of the evaluation was not halmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
111. CONCLUSION 
As set out in the Opening Brief and above, the order denying post-conviction relief must 
be reversed for three reasons: 1) because the district court's finding that it did not rely upon the 
psychosexual evaluation in sentencing or denying Rule 35 relief, and thus there was no prejudice 
for purposes of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel, violated the law of the case 
doctrine; 2) because the district court's finding that it did not rely upon the psychosexual 
evaluation in sentencing or denying Rule 35 relief, and thus there was no prejudice for puposes 
of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel, was clearly erroneous; and 3) because the denial 
of the collstitutional right to remain silent should have been analyzed under the Chapman 
standard of hamless enor, a standard the state did not and cannot meet. 
For these reasons, Carlos asks this Court to reverse the order denying post-conviction 
relief and remand for further proceedings. 
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